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now clear that a representative corporate officer can be indicted under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, there seems to be no good reason why he may
not, alternatively and at the discretion of the Justice Department, be indicted under the appropriate section of Clayton Act which carries a
lesser maximum penalty. There is certainly some question whether Congress ever anticipated putting such power in the hands of the Justice Department. Although the Department traditionally has made recommendations to the courts regarding the severity of the penalty to be imposed, the
courts have always retained the option of ignoring the suggestion and
subjecting the violator to a stricted fine. If an action may now proceed
under either Act, an indictment under the Clayton Act would preclude
the courts from imposing any greater monetary burden than the five
thousand dollar fine. This would seem to be contrary to Congress's purpose of increasing the penalty provision of the Sherman Act to fifty
thousand dollars. On the other hand, if the present case is to be interpreted as implying that § 14 of the Clayton Act is merely supplemental
to § 1 of the Sherman Act and is not to be used for the purpose of indictment, the present Court has by judicial fiat repealed the former as it
applies to representative corporate officers.3 0
Myron A. Hyman
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Jones v. Superior Court (Cal. 1962).
Petitioner was charged with rape. On the day set for trial, his mo-

tion for a continuance on the ground that he needed more time to gather
medical evidence to support his intended defense of impotence was granted.
A month later, the court granted the district attorney's motion for a
discovery order, requesting that petitioner and his attorney make available
States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 73 S. Ct. 77 (1952); United States v.
Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 95-96, 61 S. Ct. 518, 523 (1940).
30. It

should be noted that Congress is still concerned with the inconsistency

created by the 1955 Amendment. In July, 1961, two bills, H.R. 3138, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961) and H.R. 3136, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) were introduced
which, if passed, will make the penalty provisions of the two Acts essentially
the same. It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court in the instant case
has attempted to second guess the legislature by declaring that the provisions were

always essentially the same. It is of course possible that convictions secured either
under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act would result in the same penalty as
long as that penalty is under $5,000, but this only demonstrates that the Court's
decision has, for practical purposes, nullified the penalty provision of the Clayton Act

as it applies to representative corporate officers. It appears likely that the Department of Justice will continue to seek indictments solely under the Sherman Act
since the Government will have greater discretion in recommending a penalty.
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to the prosecution the names of all physicians and surgeons who had been
subpoenaed to testify on the issue of impotence, the names of all physicians
who had treated petitioner prior to trial, the reports of the doctors relating to the injuries which allegedly caused his impotence and, finally,
all x-rays of petitioner taken immediately following the injuries. In an
action by petitioner for a writ of prohibition to restrain enforcement of
the trial court's order, the Supreme Court of California, per Justice
Traynor, held that the prosecution was entitled to discover the names and
addresses of the witnesses whom petitioner intended to call in support of
his "affirmative defense" of impotency, and any reports and x-rays the
latter intended to introduce as evidence thereon; but the prosecution was
not entitled to the names and reports of all the doctors who had examined
defendant regardless of whether the latter intended to introduce them to
establish his defense. Jones v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962).
Since Powell v. Superior Court,' California has increasingly taken
the lead in the field of criminal discovery. There, the California Supreme
Court ordered the prosecution to furnish the defendant with copies of
statements made to the police by the defendant. Even though the question
of granting such discovery lies essentially within the discretion of the
trial judge, the cases subsequent to Powell have followed that decision with
such routine that it can fairly be said that a defendant in a criminal case
in California is entitled, as a matter of law, to discovery of the prosecution's
evidence.2 Justification for this breach in traditional procedure may be
found in the need for securing to the accused the fairest possible trial. "
In the present case, the California Supreme Court has declared that such
procedure "should not be a one way street :"4 the prosecution is equally
entitled to discover certain unprivileged evidence.
The concept of discovery by the prosecution is not a new one. Although it seems that only California has extended its application to all
"affirmative defenses," many states have acted similarly when the defense
was one of alibi or insanity. For instance, fourteen states have adopted
so-called Alibi Statutes which force a criminal defendant contemplating
an alibi defense to give notice of such intent to the prosecution and to
furnish the latter with the names of witnesses and the character of their
testimony. 5 If the defendant fails to provide the required notice, he is
1.48 Cal. 2d 704, 312 P.2d 698 (1957).
2.E.g., Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959); Funk v.
Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959) ; Norton v. Superior Court, 173
Cal. App. 2d 133, 343 P.2d 139 (1959) ; Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d
513, 327 P.2d 68 (1958). For an excellent article on the whole system of discovery
by a criminal defendant in California, see Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real
Or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. Rev. 56 (1961).
3. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007 (1957); People v.
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566. 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
4. 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (1962).
5. Cf. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real Or Apparent?, 49 CLIF. L.
Rev. 56, 61, n.13 (1961). Along this same line, fifteen states also require defendant
to give advance notice of his intent to use the defense of insanity. Cf. WE11oFe,
MFNTAL. DsoRDnr. As A CRIMINAL. D.EsN E, 389 (1954).
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precluded from raising the defense. Prior to the instant decision, the
California Law Revision Commission had recommended that such a provision be inserted in the California Penal Code.6 Although no action had
been taken in this matter by the legislature, the California Supreme Court
in the present case seemed to have assumed the task of judicially creating
such discovery machinery for the prosecution in regard to "affirmative"
defenses. Further, it can be inferred that this discovery process will be
augmented by a general interrogatory requiring the defendant to an7
swer whether he intends to rely upon an "affirmative" defense.
The dissenting members in the instant case seemed concerned with
the notion that the whole problem of discovery by the prosecution should be
entrusted to the legislature because of the apparent inability of the
majority's decision to be reconciled with the privilege against selfincrimination. Initially, it would seem that the ennunciated rule does
represent a flagrant disregard of a defendant's privilege against selfincrimination as guaranteed by the California Constitution and Statutes. 8
However, it is submitted that the majority has just as firm a regard for
this traditional safeguard as does the dissent. It is significant that both
opinions cited People v. Talle,9 which held that to compel an accused to
give testimony prior to the establishment of a prima facie case against
him is a flagrant, shocking and prejudicial invasion of his constitutional
rights. Nonetheless, from this common source, contrary conclusions were
reached. It is suggested that the decision in the present case does not
violate the principle of the Talle case nor the privilege against selfincrimination, and can be justified on an analysis of the term "affirmative"
defense. As used in its criminal sense, it can be said to refer to those
defenses which actually traverse material elements of the indictments, and
which, in disregard of the state's evidence, attempt to set up an independent state of facts inconsistent with certain averments in the indictment. In short, "affirmative" defense directly relates to no part of the
state's case; consequently, the discovered material cannot possibly be used
by the prosecution in establishing its prima facie case. It's only function
6. California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation And Study Relating

To Notice Of Alibi In Criminal Actions (1960).
7. This is pointed out by Justice Peters, in his dissenting opinion:
If the majority opinion were sound, it would mean logically that theprosecution

could serve interrogatories upon a defendant demanding to know whether or
not he intends to rely upon an 'affirmative' defense, what it is, and what evidence he has to support it. 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 885.
To give any real meaning to the rule it could not be. restricted to those cases in
which the defendant accidentally disclosed his intention of raising an 'affirmative'
defense.
8. CAL. CoNs'rI. art. 1, § 13 reads: "No person shall ... be compelled, in any
criminal case, to be a witness against himself . . ." CAL. PENAI, CoD8 § 688 provides:
"No person can be compelled, in a criminal action, to be a witness against himself . . ."; § 1323 states: "A defendant in a criminal action or proceeding cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself..."; § 1323.5 provides that in all criminal
proceedings "the person accused or charged shall, at his own request, but not otlherwise, be deemed a competent witness."
9. 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 245 P.2d 633 (1952).
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can be to rebut the "affirmative" defense if it is raised. Therefore, the
right of the defendant to remain absolutely mute until the establishment of
a prima facie case is in no sense undermined. The use of the discovered
evidence will not furnish "leads" to the prosecution,1 ° for nothing can
be uncovered with this evidence which will assist the prosecution in
establishing its initial case against the defendant. Further, as the majority points out, "the discovery of the defense witnesses and the existence
of any reports or x-rays the defense offers in evidence will necessarily be
revealed at the trial."" And if, after hearing the presentation of the case
against him, the defendant decides to abandon his "affirmative" plea, he
has not been prejudiced in any way. The defendant is not deprived of
his traditional right of waiting until the close of the prosecution's case to
determine the defense or defenses, if any, which he might then interpose.
The decision in the instant case is a sound one and an important one.
It represents a progression away from the archaic thinking on which the
adversary system of trial is based, and sets up a "wholly reasonable rule
of pleading which in no manner compels a defendant to give evidence
other than what he himself may give at trial."1 2 One of the principal
elements in an adversary proceeding is surprise.' 3 Why this should have
any place in a criminal trial where the attainment of truth and justice is
paramount cannot be easily seen. The courts have struggled hard to
guarantee to the defendant the fairest possible trial. The California courts
10. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 12 S. Ct. 195 (1892), established
a rule of complete immunity where a defendant bargained away his right against
self-incrimination in return for a promise of immunity from prosecution. It was
held that the immunity granted must be as broad as possible to prevent prosecution
for other crimes discovered by the use of evidence or "leads" given by the defendant
under a promise of immunity against prosecution for another crime.
11. 22 Cal Rptr. 879, 882 (1962).
12. Ibid.
13. In this connection see 8 MINN. L. Rgv. 357 (1923), where, in a letter written
to the Bench & Bar, Edward Freeman, a Minnesota district court judge, stated:
At the present time, under his plea of 'not guilty', he [defendant] can sit back
and make just as much trouble as he wishes for the state, making the state
prove every item of the crime, and prove it to such an extent that the state
can feel it can rest knowing that the defendant may not take the stand. They
can, a great many times, cause the state a great deal of trouble in proving some
of the facts, and after the state has, perhaps, taken a week or so to put in its
case, the defendant will calmly go on the stand, admit all the facts it has taken
the state several days to prove, and will then proceed to build his defense on the
testimony the state has had to use. He may change his ground of defense
several times and at the last moment may come with some matter in defense
that it is almost impossible for the state to rebut in the short notice it is
given.
Also in this regard, see Dean, Advance Specification Of Defense In Criminal Cases,
20 A.B.A.J. 435 (1934), where it is observed that:
In a criminal case pleadings tell nothing, and at the appropriate moment the
defendant with a perjured defense has his choice of a corps of insanity experts,
alibi witnesses who will testify that he was in another locality at the time of
the offense, friends who will assert he acted in self-defense, was entrapped into
committing the crime, that he labored under mistake or ignorance of law or
fact, that he was an infant, coerced, intoxicated, immune from prosecution, or
otherwise justified. Prosecution flounders in the dark. There is a last minute
futile attempt to collect rebuttal evidence. Reasonable doubt has been raised.
An acquittal follows, and the books on trial tactics have another illustration on
how to 'beat the case' through surprise.
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